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THE ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY 
RECORDS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM A 
TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH TO 
QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY 
DAVID GRAY∗ 
I. Introduction 
Long a topic of interest only to Fourth Amendment groupies and would-
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  First 
and foremost, thanks are due to Professor Stephen Henderson and his colleagues on the 
ABA Task Force who were prescient in pressing the initiative that led to these standards and 
have committed so much time and good will to their project.  Although this essay advances 
some concerns about the results, the value of the Standards as they stand and as an ongoing 
project cannot be overstated.  This essay is itself part of an ongoing project addressing 
Fourth Amendment rights and remedies in the twenty-first century.  Among its most 
important components are: Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of 
Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013); 
David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2013); David Gray 
& Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); David 
Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the 
Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); David 
Gray, Danielle Keats Citron, & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States 
v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745 (2013); and David Gray, Meagan Cooper, & 
David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 7 (2012).  For their support and feedback on these efforts, gratitude is due to those who 
listened and commented during presentations at Georgetown, Law and Society, Yale, the 
Annual Meeting of the ABA/AALS Criminal Law Section, the University of North Carolina, 
Northwestern University, the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, the Computers, Freedom, 
and Privacy Conference, and during conversations at the American Law Institute Meeting on 
Information Privacy Law and Harvard Law Review’s Symposium on Informational Privacy.  
Particular thanks go to Ronald Allen, Julia Angwin, Jack Balkin, Kevin Bankston, Steve 
Bellovin, Marc Blitz, Richard Boldt, Becky Bolin, Mary Bowman, Al Brophy, Andrew 
Chin, Bryan Choi, Thomas Clancy, Julie Cohen, Thomas Crocker, Nick Doty, Lisa Marie 
Freitas, Susan Freiwald, Barry Friedman, Brandon Garrett, Bob Gellman, Don Gifford, 
Mark Graber, John Grant, James Grimmelmann, Deborah Hellman, Stephen Henderson, 
Leslie Meltzer Henry, Lance Hoffman, Renée Hutchins, Camilla Hrdy, Orin Kerr, Joseph 
Kennedy, Catherine Kim, Anne Klinefelter, Avner Levin, Michael Mannheimer, Dan 
Markel, Christina Mulligan, Richard Myers, Neil Richards, Kathryn Sabbeth, Laurent 
Sacharoff, Paul Schwartz, Christopher Slobogin, Robert Smith, Dan Solove, Max Stearns, 
David Super, Harry Surden, Peter Swire, Peter Quint, Jason Weinstein, Arthur Weisburd, 
and Jonathan Witmer-Rich.  Finally, deepest thanks to the W.P. Carey Foundation for its 
support of Maryland-Carey School of Law and the scholarly efforts of its faculty.   
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
920 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:919 
 
 
be Supreme Court justices,1 the third party doctrine is now a central 
concern for citizens of the United States and the world.2  Much of the 
impetus for this global awakening is a series of leaked documents proving 
what many privacy scholars already suspected or knew3: the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National 
Security Administration (NSA), their foreign counterparts,4 and a host of 
domestic agents,5 are engaged in programs of expansive and invasive 
surveillance that many have credibly compared to the dark prophesies of 
George Orwell’s 1984.6  Science fiction, it seems, is now reality.   
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Michael Dolan, The Bork Tapes, CITY PAPER, Sept. 25, 1987, at 1. 
 2. See, e.g., Louise Osborne, Europeans Outraged over NSA Spying, Threaten Action, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/28/report-
nsa-spain/3284609/; Alissa Rubin, French Condemn Surveillance by N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 2013, at A4; Craig Timberg, Google Encrypts to Defend Against Spying, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1. 
 3. James Bamford has been leading the reportage charge since well before the recent 
revelations.  See, e.g., JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA 
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2008) [hereinafter THE SHADOW FACTORY]; 
James Bamford, The Black Box, WIRED MAG., Apr. 2012, at 78 [hereinafter Bamford, The 
Black Box], available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/. 
 4. Among the most cooperative are parties to the United Kingdom-United States of 
America Agreement British, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia, which are collectively referred to as the “Five Eyes.”  See THE 
SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 3, at 212-33.  The U.K.’s General Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) has been particularly helpful, playing a key role in efforts by the 
NSA to surreptitiously tap data cables and switches located outside the United States in 
order to access user information from Google and Yahoo.  See id. at 215-18; Charles Arthur, 
Google Engineer Accuses NSA and GCHQ of Subverting ‘Judicial Process’, GUARDIAN, 
Nov. 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/06/google-nsa-gchq-spying-
judicial-process. 
 5. For example, recently released orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
document support provided by telecommunications companies like Verizon and AT&T to the 
NSA and FBI’s telephonic surveillance programs.  See In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order 
Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80, at 4 (Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Ct., Apr. 25, 2013) available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/ page/politics/ 
government-documents-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/ (ordering 
the disclosure of “all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by [telephone 
companies] for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within 
the United States, including local telephone calls.”).  Other companies gather and aggregate 
data for government agencies on a contract basis.  See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s 
Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package 
Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595-96 (2004); Natasha 
Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1. 
 6. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Anger Swells After NSA Phone Records Court 
Order Revelations, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/8
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Among the more disturbing features of this burgeoning surveillance state 
is the increasing access that governments have to information about us and 
our activities—information that we entrust to third parties such as our 
telephone companies, financial institutions, internet service providers, 
social networks, and commercial partners.  Take, for example, the 
revelation that the NSA, in conjunction with the FBI, has been gathering 
“all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by [telephone 
companies] for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; 
or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”7  
Although these agencies have so far denied gathering either the contents of 
telephonic communications8 or the identities of the callers, telephony 
metadata, which usually includes telephone numbers, call location, call 
duration, and call frequency, “can provide authorities with vast knowledge 
about a caller’s identity.”9  “[C]ross-checked against other public records, 
the metadata can reveal someone’s name, address, driver’s license, credit 
history, social security number and more.”10  A second program, referred to 
in leaked documents as “PRISM,” reportedly allows NSA access to 
information held on the central servers of nine leading U.S. internet 
companies, “extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails, 
documents, and connection logs.”11  In addition to, or as part of, this 
                                                                                                                 
jun/06/obama-administration-nsa-verizon-records (“From a civil liberties perspective, the 
program could hardly be any more alarming.  It’s a program in which some untold number 
of innocent people have been put under the constant surveillance of government agents.  It is 
beyond Orwellian, and it provides further evidence of the extent to which basic democratic 
rights are being surrendered in secret to the demands of unaccountable intelligence 
agencies.” (quoting Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union)). 
 7. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 13-80, at 4.   
 8. Spencer Ackerman, NSA Goes on 60 Minutes: The Definitive Facts Behind CBS’ 
Flawed Report, GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/16/ 
nsa-surveillance-60-minutes-cbs-facts.  James Bamford has reported that government agencies 
are siphoning off content as well.  See Bamford, The Black Box, supra note 3, at 84.  Recent 
revelations of the NSA’s unauthorized infiltration of server networks maintained by Google 
and Yahoo as part of the “clouds” in which they store customers’ documents and 
communications support Bamford’s reportage.  Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA 
Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, at 
A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-
yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d66 1e-4166-11e3-
8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
 9. Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 6. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Mines Internet Firms’ Data, Documents 
Show, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/investiga 
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program, the NSA has also surreptitiously tapped into the physical 
components of these companies’ cloud computing networks, gaining access 
to unencrypted user data transmitted between secure data centers.12  A third 
program, dubbed XKeyscore, provides government analysts with the 
capacity to mine content and metadata generated by email, chat, and 
browsing activities through a global network of servers and internet access 
points operated by private entities.13   
These leaked documents confirm previous reports about a 
comprehensive domestic surveillance program that has been underway at 
least since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.14  The current 
revelations go much farther, however, providing credible evidence that 
government agencies are collecting not only “metadata,” but also the 
contents of all electronic communications that travel through infrastructure 
located in the United States or one of its partner nations.15  Although 
seemingly fantastic, it is increasingly difficult to discount accounts of such 
programs.  All the more so in light of the fact that the NSA is in the process 
of building massive data centers capable of storing petabytes of 
information.16  Why, after all, would the federal government’s premier 
signals spy agency need such facilities if it was not engaged in a 
commensurably massive data collection effort?  Thus, it is a fairly safe bet 
that the government is already, or soon will be, collecting and retaining all 
of our electronic and telephonic communications, providing government 
agents with contemporary and perpetual access to details about everywhere 
we go and everything we do, say, or write when using or in the company of 
technology.17   
                                                                                                                 
tions/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/ 
06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html. 
 12. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 8, at A1. 
 13. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User Does 
on the Internet,” GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/ 
nsa-top-secret-program-online-data. 
 14. See THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 3, at 177-96; Bamford, The Black Box, 
supra note 3; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/ 
politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all; Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/ 
12/the-fed-who-blew-the-whistle.html.  
 15. See sources cited supra notes 11-13; THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 3, at 212-
33. 
 16. See Bamford, The Black Box, supra note 3, at 80, 82-83. 
 17. See id. at 84; Isikoff, supra note 14; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 14.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/8
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As unsettling as these massive electronic surveillance programs are, they 
are merely one branch of the rapidly expanding surveillance state in which 
we live.  Our public spaces are being overtaken by a growing archipelago of 
observation systems deployed for public and private security, traffic 
control, environmental monitoring, and innumerable other purposes.18  
They are mounted to buildings, utility poles, cars, and sometimes people.19  
They are transported through the ether on unmanned drones.20  Once kept in 
silos, the inputs from these sources increasingly are aggregated and 
analyzed by a nationwide network of fusion centers and local law 
enforcement efforts like New York City’s Domain Awareness System, 
developed in collaboration with Microsoft,21 or Virtual Alabama, which has 
been developed by Google with its state partner.22  The inevitable end, if 
not the intent and purpose, seems to be constant and pervasive observation 
of everywhere we go, and everything we do, in public spaces. 
Much of this expanding surveillance state intersects with or depends on 
private entities.  The internet and portable electronic devices have become 
ubiquitous and play an increasingly central role in almost every aspect of 
our lives.23  These technologies require us to share a vast amount of 
information with third parties.24  We cannot buy things using credit cards 
without sharing vendor information.25  Whether we are using landlines or 
                                                                                                                 
 18. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
62, 63-72 (2013). 
 19. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1450-52 (2011) (noting that fusion 
centers, where federal and state analysts share intelligence data, routinely look at everything 
from traffic tickets and credit reports to video clips submitted by citizens). 
 20. See Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAG., Feb. 11, 2013, at 28, 31-33; Jennifer 
Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www. 
eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you.  In the United States, “approximately 
50 companies, universities, and government organizations are developing and producing 
some 155 unmanned aircraft designs.”  Lynch, supra.  In 2010, expenditures on unmanned 
aircraft in the United States exceeded three billion dollars and are expected to surpass seven 
billion dollars over the next ten years.  Id. 
 21. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 65-66. 
 22. Id. at 66-67. 
 23. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). 
 25. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976) (holding that bank 
customers cannot raise a Fourth Amendment bar against government subpoena for bank 
records documenting their transactions because banks and their customers are parties to the 
underlying transactions, and customers must share information about those transactions with 
their banks in order for the banks to perform their roles). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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cellular phones, we cannot make or receive calls without sharing call details 
with our service providers,26 including our locations.27  Many of the apps 
and concierge services we use on our phones, tablets, and computers cannot 
function without knowing where we are.28  We cannot search or surf the 
web without our search engines’ and internet service providers’ knowing 
what we look for and where we go.  Email services search the content of 
our email in order to target us for the advertisements that subsidize their 
services.29  Many web pages install cookies on our computers, or use other 
tracking mechanisms, and then auction visual space in our browsers to 
competing advertisers.30  We post to social networking sites.  We blog.  We 
tweet.  In short, there is an almost constant stream of data between us and 
the corporate world, most of which goes unrecognized31 or unappreciated 
until we receive an eerily insightful solicitation.32 
Although few, if any, of us really grasp how much information we share 
with institutional third parties, or know what they do with that information, 
our naïveté is periodically challenged.  For example, in a frequently 
discussed article, the New York Times reported in 2012 that the retailer 
Target uses information purchased from third parties in combination with 
proprietary consumer data to identify newly pregnant women.33  Target 
then, well, targets these women, sending coupons and offers for pregnancy 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 27. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2014) (requiring cell phone carriers to use cell tower 
information or GPS technology to locate phones that make 9-1-1 calls on their networks). 
 28. One example is the popular social networking site Foursquare, which gives 
recommendations for services based on users’ current location.  See About Foursquare, 
FOURSQUARE, https://foursquare.com/about (last visited Apr. 10, 2014). 
 29. For example, this is the business model for Google’s Gmail service.  See Ads in 
Gmail, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6603?hl=en (last visited Apr. 10, 
2014). 
 30. See, e.g., Ad Targeting, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/160 
525?hl=en (last visited Apr. 10, 2014) (explaining the purpose and function of Google’s 
Adwords). 
 31. For example, as Jennifer Golbeck reported recently, Facebook uses the content of 
draft and unpublished posts to target advertisements.  Jennifer Gollacek, On Second 
Thought . . ., SLATE (Dec. 13, 2014), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/ 
future_Tense2013/12/facebook_self_censorship_what_happens_to_the_posts_you_don_t_pu
blish.html. 
 32. See Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html (recounting 
how Target uses publicly available databases and market analytics to identify women who 
are in the early stages of pregnancy). 
 33. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/8
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and baby products.34  In one of the cases reported by the Times, Target’s 
marketing efforts notified a customer’s family that she was pregnant before 
she did.35  Many of us have similar, though more routine, moments of 
recognition when we see advertisements in our browsers pressing products 
we looked at days or weeks earlier; or we receive word from vendors 
thanking us for our interest in items we were linked to through an email 
earlier in the day.   
Roger Clarke foresaw the rise of this practice, which he dubbed 
“dataveillance,” in the late 1980s.36  He would have categorized much of 
the contemporary use of data in commerce as “personal” in so far as it 
focuses on conduct that engages the attention of particular information 
consumers.37  Clarke would categorize the more diffuse, and largely 
indiscriminate, data gathering engaged in by the NSA as “mass 
dataveillance.”38  These sorts of practices, often dubbed “Big Data” by 
contemporary scholars, seek to gather as much information as possible with 
the hope that subsequent analysis may reveal suspicious patterns of events 
or even persons of interest.39  Here, the NSA is not alone.  The National 
Counterterrorism Center recently secured authority to gather from third 
parties a broad range of information on every airline passenger entering the 
United States, including travel history, financial data, and even medical 
records.40  Under authority granted by the Affordable Care Act, passed in 
2012, the Department of Health and Homeland Security, along with its 
designees, can now require that agencies and healthcare providers collect 
and report a wide range of patient information, including “race, ethnicity, 
sex, primary language, and disability status.”41  Of course, government is 
not the only Big Data player.  Private data aggregators like Acxiom, who 
have been dubbed “Big Brother’s Little Helpers” by Chris Hoofnagle, buy 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMMC’NS OF 
ACM 498, 498 (1988). 
 37. Id. at 502-03.  
 38. Id. at 503-04. 
 39. See David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime 
After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 765-83 (2013). 
 40. Julia Angwin, U.S. Terror Agency to Tap Citizen Files, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012, 
at A1. 
 41. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3101, 124 
Stat. 119, 579 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300kk (2012)); see also Gray, Citron & 
Rinehart, supra note 39, at 765-70; Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The 
Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 683, 687 (2013). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
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and collect mass quantities of information from a range of private and 
public sources, which they then package and sell.42   
There is no doubt that dataveillance, whether mass or personal, can serve 
important governmental and commercial purposes.43  For example, Big 
Data in the healthcare arena has the potential to facilitate medical 
research,44 epidemiological forecasting,45 and efforts to combat fraud.46  It 
also raises serious privacy concerns.  As the breadth and scope of data 
gathering and aggregation grow, the potential for bad information to leak 
into the system increases.47  Given the high degree of data sharing and 
largely uncritical interpenetration of databases,48 these errors can be quite 
consequential for citizens, affecting their abilities to borrow, buy, or travel, 
and sometimes harming their job prospects.49  Accurate and reliable 
dataveillance may be even more dangerous, however.50  As Justice 
Sotomayor has pointed out, granting government “unfettered discretion”51 
to gather “comprehensive record[s]”52 that disclose details of “familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”53 “chills 
associational and expressive freedoms”54 while “alter[ing] the relationship 
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to a democratic 
society.”55  It also raises fearsome specters of a surveillance state, leading 
many commentators to draw vivid analogies to literary dystopias.56   
                                                                                                                 
 42. Hoofnagle, supra note 5, at 595-96. 
 43. See Gray, Citron & Rinehart, supra note 39, at 765-800. 
 44. See Pasquale, supra note 41, at 683 
 45. Jody Ray Bennett, The Big Data Contagion, DATAVERSITY (June 21, 2012), 
http://www.dataversity.net/the-big-data-contagion/. 
 46. See Gray, Citron, & Rinehart, supra note 39, at 770-82. 
 47. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 80-81. 
 48. Id. at 119-20; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 19, at 1443. 
 49. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1273-77 (2008). 
 50. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2008) (“Government’s most important technique of control is no longer watching 
or threatening to watch.  It is analyzing and drawing connections between data.”); Gray & 
Citron, supra note 18, at 82. 
 51. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).  
 56. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 76 n.88 (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN 
EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949)); Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 6 (quoting the ACLU’s Jameel 
Jaffer as characterizing the NSA’s telephonic surveillance program as being “beyond 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/8
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Given these privacy concerns, one might expect that the Fourth 
Amendment, which guards “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy,”57 would 
impose some constraints on the government’s ability to engage in 
dataveillance.  Under present doctrine, however, it does not.  This is due 
primarily to a long line of cases standing for the general proposition that, 
when you share information with others, you assume the risk that those 
whom you trust will pass it along to the government, whether on their own 
initiative or in response to a subpoena, warrant, or other “lawful process.”58  
Although one member of the Court is ready to reconsider this “third party 
doctrine” in light of governmental efforts to engage in mass data collection 
and aggregation,59 the Court has yet to take up the question.60  In the 
meantime, government agents continue to exploit the third party doctrine to 
facilitate their expanding surveillance programs.  It is precisely this lacuna 
                                                                                                                 
Orwellian”); cf. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The 
Fourth Amendment demands that we temper our efforts to apprehend criminals with a 
concern for the impact on our fundamental liberties of the methods we use.  I hope it will be 
a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance methods they would 
sanction were among those described 40 years ago in George Orwell’s dread vision of life in 
the 1980’s.”); Bill Keller, Op-Ed., Living with the Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2013, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/opinion/keller-living-with-
the -surveillance-state.html (likening the Domain Awareness System, an interconnected 
system of CCTV cameras and law enforcement databases in Britain, to Orwell’s “Big 
Brother” of Nineteen Eighty-Four). 
 57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 58. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979); United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974); United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 777 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).  
As is common in this area of Fourth Amendment law, the Standards overstate the rule 
described by the third party doctrine, which surely does not provide that “one typically 
retains no federal constitutional reasonable expectation of privacy in information conveyed 
to a third party.”  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS 
TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS 6 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS].  Individual 
standards will be referred to using the format ‘STANDARD x.x.’  Were this the rule then Katz 
would have been wrongly decided—after all, Katz did by definition share everything 
overheard by the government’s electronic listening device with the parties to his phone calls. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.  
 59. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 60. There are several lawsuits working their way through the courts that may present the 
Court with an opportunity to reconsider the third party doctrine.  See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the NSA’s telephony metadata 
collection program is constitutional under the third- party doctrine); Klayman v. Obama, 957 
F. Supp. 2d 1, 37 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that the NSA’s telephony metadata collection 
program is unconstitutional despite the third party doctrine). 
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that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on Law Enforcement Access 
to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards) propose to span. 
Recognizing the privacy implications of dataveillance, and even 
governmental access to discrete, but revelatory, bits of personal data, the 
LEATPR Standards propose super-constitutional constraints on law 
enforcement access to information held by institutional third parties.  These 
efforts are neither unprecedented nor unwelcome.61  Since its inception, the 
third party doctrine has been a point of considerable concern for citizens 
and scholars alike.62  In the face of those worries, the political branches 
have taken action to guarantee some degree of privacy in certain shared 
information, even if the Constitution guarantees none.  For example, in the 
face of concerns about the use of pen register devices, which were 
sanctioned by the Court in Smith v. Maryland,63 Congress passed the Pen 
Register Act64 as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 (ECPA).65  Among its more important provisions, the Pen Register 
Act limits telephone companies’ use of these devices for their own purposes 
and imposes a requirement for a court order for any law enforcement use.66  
In the wake of concerns about the disclosure of video rental histories raised 
during the confirmation proceedings for Supreme Court nominee Robert 
Bork, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA).67  The 
VPPA requires that video rental businesses maintain the privacy of their 
customers’ viewing habits and interposes courts between law enforcement 
and video rental companies.68  
In contrast to these past efforts, we have yet to see any significant 
legislative reactions to growing concerns about dataveillance and 
                                                                                                                 
 61. For examples of extra-constitutional legislative constraints on law enforcement 
surveillance efforts, see infra notes 64-68.  For prior examples of ABA model standards, see 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SECTION A: 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS (3d ed. 2001); ABA STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SECTION B: TECHNOLOGICALLY-
ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE (3d ed. 1999). 
 62. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the ‘Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy’, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1314-15 (1981).  
 63. 442 U.S. at 745-46. 
 64. Pen/Trap Statute (Pen Register Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, Title III, 100 Stat. 1868 
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2012)). 
 65. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012).  
 67. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)). 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(C). 
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widespread government access to data shared with third parties.  Although 
some judges and scholars hold out hope that Congress will step in,69 it has 
yet to do so in any meaningful way.  Even in the face of recent revelations 
about general warrants for telephonic metadata,70 which were issued by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to the FBI and NSA under the 
auspices of the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act, there seems to be 
little interest in establishing new constraints, despite calls by a small 
minority of legislators.71  Other commentators hope that the executive will 
restrain itself, but there is very little reason to think that it can or will given 
current efforts by the FBI and NSA to defend their widespread data 
gathering and to avoid any meaningful outside review.72 
In the face of these legislative, executive, and judicial failures, the 
LEATPR Standards are agnostic as to which regime73—legislative, 
executive, or judicial—should bear the burden of action.  They instead try 
to chart a regulatory structure that conceivably could be adopted and 
implemented as part of a judicial order, a legislative enactment, or an 
executive policy.74  As a consequence, the Standards do not take a position 
on whether current data-sharing practices between institutional third parties 
and law enforcement raise any constitutional concerns.  Rather, they start 
from the premise that there is something creepy going on and then take a 
                                                                                                                 
 69. E.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); Orin 
Kerr, Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
933, 943 (2004). 
 70. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 119. 
 71. The exception is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 
2013, S. 607, 113th Cong. (2013) & H.R. 1847, 113th Cong. (2013), which would require 
police to get a warrant for production of information and to provide notice to those whose 
records were sought.  The Bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 
25, 2013, but has yet to clear the House Committee.  None of the revelations about NSA and 
FBI surveillance and dataveillance in the intervening months seem to have moved the ball. 
 72. Not surprisingly, this is the approach advocated by the NSA.  See In re Application 
of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80, 
at 3-6 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) (describing “minimization” 
procedures adopted within the NSA and FBI to limit access to and use of telephonic 
metadata).  For a discussion of these procedures, see Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 119-
23. 
 73. I take this use of “regime” from Akhil Amar, who has long pressed for each of the 
three constitutional branches of government, or regimes, to do its part in protecting Fourth 
Amendment rights.  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES 43-45 (1997). 
 74. STANDARD 25-3.4. 
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brave stab at both describing and addressing that creepiness without taking 
any position on whether or how the Constitution is implicated. 
Although there is broad agreement that there is something creepy about 
the expanding scope of government’s access to the products of data 
aggregation and discrete surveillance performed by third parties, that 
consensus quickly falls apart once one starts to focus on why it is creepy 
and what can or should be done.  Some think that “creepy” is as far as it 
goes, and that contemporary norms, commerce, economics, and the realities 
of modern politics augur against any governmental intervention.75  Others 
argue that programs of broad governmental surveillance, whether 
accomplished directly or through third parties, is socially destructive and 
constitutionally infirm.76  While stopping well short of hysteria, the 
Standards take seriously the impact on privacy of expanding data-sharing 
relationships between the government and private parties.77  Nothing that 
follows in this essay will attempt to dissuade contributors and consumers 
from this view.  Rather, it will argue that the approach taken by the 
Standards is conceptually and practically fraught. 
Although far too short to provide a conclusive case, this essay will argue 
that the LEATPR Standards adopt a strategy that is likely to fail and instead 
promote a regulatory framework that poses serious threats to core interests 
in individual liberty and functioning democracy that lie behind privacy 
claims.  The strategic error is located in the Standards’ refusal to find some 
constitutional ground that might demonstrate the necessity and sufficiency 
of its provisions.  Part II provides a brief overview of some of the critical 
decisions reflected in the Standards.  Parts III and IV explore the 
consequences of these choices.  Part V turns to the regulatory framework 
proposed by the Standards and focuses in particular on the decision to 
govern access to information held by third parties according to a spectrum 
of privacy interests, which ranges from “highly private” to “not private.”78  
Although this approach has a certain intuitive appeal, the project of 
describing these categories and assigning values to information poses a 
serious threat to individual autonomy, political neutrality, and democratic 
norms.  In the end, these criticisms are self-defeating.  After all, it is hard to 
get too spun up about the dangers of a regulatory framework that is doomed 
never to be adopted in the first place.  They are offered here nevertheless in 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Kerr, supra note 69, at 943. 
 76. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 101-24. 
 77. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 4-5.  
 78. Id. at 9-11.  
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the hope that they may be of some assistance to those seeking to step into 
the regulatory fray as they consider other alternatives.79   
II. An Overview of the LEATPR Standards’ Basic Approach 
As a prelude to the discussion that follows, it is worth highlighting a few 
features of the LEATPR Standards that raise some concerns.  The first of 
these is the Standards’ agnosticism with respect to constitutional issues.80  
The Standards’ Introduction emphasizes this posture, pointing out that “the 
Standards do not purport to interpret the federal constitution nor any state 
equivalent, nor the many statutes and administrative regulations that 
regulate law enforcement access to third party records.”81  Thus, the 
Standards do not challenge the third party doctrine or otherwise tether the 
project of general reform, or the specific provisions set forth by the 
Standards, to any constitutional theory.  This agnosticism raises two very 
important issues and potential points of concern.   
The first is the question of constitutional sufficiency.  Standard 25-2.2 
makes clear that any efforts to adopt and apply the Standards, in whole or in 
part, cannot “authorize a protection less than that required by the federal 
Constitution, nor less than that required by its respective state 
Constitution.”82  Although considerate,83 this provision just highlights the 
possibility that the Standards are constitutionally infirm.  As we shall see in 
a moment, this is a significant worry in present circumstances, where new 
technologies and expanding surveillance regimes have opened the third 
party doctrine, the public observation doctrine, and other seemingly well-
established Fourth Amendment rules to new constitutional challenges.   
                                                                                                                 
 79. Among these is a proposal that Danielle Citron and I have advanced, which would 
focus on regulating the technologies that are used to facilitate programs of dataveillance.  
Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 101-24.  
 80. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 9 (“Fortunately, it is not necessary for 
purposes of these Standards to answer these constitutional questions.”).  It appears that this 
agnosticism reflects a decision by the ABA rather than the drafters, at least some of whom 
sought to ground the Standards in claims of constitutional necessity.  Stephen Henderson, 
Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law, Remarks at the Oklahoma Law Review 
Symposium: Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (Nov. 15, 2013).  Perhaps the 
points made here will be of some assistance in persuading the ABA to change its view when 
and if the Standards are considered for review and revision. 
 81. Id. at 9. 
 82. STANDARD 25-2.2. 
 83. Standard 25-2.2 is gratuitous, after all.  By definition, the Standards could never 
hope to justify legislation or administrative practice that is constitutionally deficient. 
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The second concern derived from the Standards’ constitutional 
agnosticism is the question of constitutional necessity.  Returning to 
Standard 25-2.2, the Standards do not take a position on what protections 
are or should be demanded by federal or state constitutions.  For example, 
the Standards do not challenge the third party doctrine or imply a 
constitutionally grounded expectation of privacy in information shared with 
third parties, whether that information is “highly private” or only 
“moderately private.”84  As a consequence, the Standards provide no 
constitutional impetus for either the project or its components, relying 
instead on the political process to carry the full mantle of motive and action.  
As is discussed below, there is very good reason to doubt that the Standards 
will have any effect if their fate is left to legislatures and executives.  
Although public responses to recent revelations about NSA surveillance 
raise some hope that the political will to adopt rules along the lines 
described by the Standards may be there, persistent linkages between 
surveillance and national security make it hard to be too sunny in the 
context of our perpetual war on terror.  Those concerns are particularly 
salient given the Standards’ specific refusal to regulate any governmental 
efforts to access third party records in the context of national security 
investigations.85  That exclusion may well render the whole project 
academic in the most pejorative sense of the word. 
These concerns are amplified by the fact that the Standards take no 
position on who should be the prime mover in promoting reform.  Among 
those who think that the gathering and sharing of personal information by 
third parties should be regulated, there is considerable disagreement about 
who is best placed to develop and enforce regulations.  Some think that the 
market should take the lead, with companies competing for consumers 
based in part on how much data they gather, how long they keep it, how 
they share it, and how vigorously they contest government attempts to gain 
access.86  Others favor the political branches, and legislatures in 
                                                                                                                 
 84. STANDARD 25-4.1.  
 85. STANDARD 25-2.1(a). 
 86. For example, this perspective is at the heart of the “do not track” movement in 
browser technology, which has been driven largely by consumer demand.  See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 63-69 
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/
101201privacyreport.pdf. 
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particular.87  Some maintain that the privacy issues rise to a constitutional 
level, and therefore require court intervention—if only to force sluggish 
elected officials to action.88  The Standards remain agnostic on these 
questions as well.89  Thus, the Standards are offered as a framework that 
could be adopted by “legislatures, courts acting in their supervisory 
capacities, [or] administrative agencies.”90 
The final feature of the Standards that will guide the discussion here is 
their focus on the contents of third party records sought by government 
agents rather than other regulatory targets.  Even among those who agree on 
the best forum for regulation, there is considerable disagreement on what 
approach to take.  Some have focused on how much data is gathered or 
shared.91  Others have focused on how long surveillance is conducted.92  
Among the more prominent proponents of these “quantitative” approaches 
are Christopher Slobogin93 and the four justices who joined Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones.94  A third group has made the 
case for focusing on how surveillance is accomplished.  With my coauthor 
Danielle Citron, I have made the case for this method-centered approach, 
which would regulate both direct and indirect governmental access to and 
use of surveillance and data aggregation technologies capable of effecting 
broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance.95  A fourth group of scholars 
                                                                                                                 
 87. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Kerr, supra note 
69, at 943. 
 88. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 69-70, 112. 
 89. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 9 (“Fortunately, it is not necessary for 
purposes of these Standards to answer these constitutional questions.  Although decision 
makers will of course be bound by constitutional decisions (see Standard 25-2.2), the 
Standards do not purport to interpret the federal constitution nor any state equivalent, nor the 
many statutes and administrative regulations that regulate law enforcement access to third 
party records.  They instead carefully consider all of these, and other sources, in providing a 
framework via which decision makers, including legislatures, courts acting in their 
supervisory capacities, and administrative agencies, can answer such questions, thereby 
thoughtfully and consistently regulating government access to third party records.”).  
 90. Id.  
 91. This “mosaic” theory is credited to Judge Ginsburg’s opinion for the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 
544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 92. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance 
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 
(2012). 
 93. Id. 
 94. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 95. Gray & Citron, supra note 18. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
934 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:919 
 
 
and policy makers argues that regulations should focus on what kinds of 
data and information are gathered and shared.96  For example, Neil Richards 
has argued that we should be most concerned with surveillance that gathers 
information implicating “intellectual privacy.”97  The Standards also favor 
this content-based approach.  As we shall see, there are good reasons to 
worry that this choice may compromise core commitments to individual 
liberty, among other core democratic principles.98 
III. The Consequences of Constitutional Agnosticism 
Although there are many historical narratives explaining the current state 
and history of Fourth Amendment law and doctrine, one of the most 
compelling is the courts’ deployments of Fourth Amendment principles and 
applications of founding-era analogies to address changes in law 
enforcement practice and advancing surveillance technology.  Take, for 
examples, the exclusionary rule and the Katz doctrine.  During the founding 
era, and well into the nineteenth century, there were no professionalized 
police forces.99  Law enforcement was largely motivated by private action 
with minimal assistance provided by constables, who were more often 
criticized for their sloth than for their aggressive search and seizure 
practices.100  Although colonials had experience with writs of assistance, 
these general warrants were used largely to facilitate tax enforcement and 
trade policy rather than to advance general law enforcement purposes or for 
government intelligence gathering.101  As a consequence, the sorts of police 
conduct that concern us today—invasive home searches, routine searches 
and seizures on the street, ex parte custodial interrogations, widespread 
surveillance, and ubiquitous dataveillance—were not part of the American 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641-43 (N.J. 2013). 
 97. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935-36 
(2013); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403-04 (2008). 
 98. Danielle Citron and I have made this case against Professor Richards.  See Danielle 
Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to 
Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013). 
99.  Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 620-21 (1999); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 
1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 447-48 (2010); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts 
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994). 
 100. See Davies, supra note 99, at 641; Oliver, supra note 99, at 452, 456; Lawrence 
Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 299, 342 (2010) (quoting ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822-
1885, at 6-7 (1967)). 
 101. Oliver, supra note 99, at 450, 456-57. 
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imagination in 1791.  It is therefore impossible to make the case that the 
Fourth Amendment originally was intended or understood to curb police 
excesses.  There simply were no police forces of any consequence and 
therefore no serious excesses to curb. The landscape began to change in the 
mid-nineteenth century as urban centers like New York City began to 
incorporate professional, paramilitary-style police forces and to endow 
those forces with broad authority to use force and violence in the service of 
detecting, preventing, and prosecuting crime.102  Police units quickly 
became institutions unto themselves, described by enterprise goals, 
populated by careerists, and vulnerable to political manipulation and 
corruption.103  What followed was an era of expanding police departments, 
increasing police powers, and more invasive and oppressive police 
practices, including searches, detentions, and “third-degree” 
interrogations.104  
Faced with these dramatic changes, courts started to take action.  The 
primary result was a series of cases, beginning with Boyd v. United States105 
in 1886 and culminating in Mapp v. Ohio106 in 1961, in which courts at both 
the federal and state levels began excluding from trial evidence that was 
found or seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Courts adopting 
this new exclusionary rule justified their actions on grounds of both 
constitutional principle and pragmatic necessity.107   
There is little doubt that the exclusionary rule represented a significant 
doctrinal novation.  Prior to 1886, there is no persuasive evidence that the 
prospect of excluding otherwise reliable evidence acquired as a result of an 
illegal search or seizure garnered any sympathy in American courts.108  
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 448, 459. 
 103. Id. at 459-60, 493. 
 104. The widely influential Wickersham Report, which the Court relied on in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1966), defines the “third degree” as “the use of physical 
brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or admissions.”  11 
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931). 
 105. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 106. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 107. David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (2013). 
 108. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 786-87 (1994) (quoting United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843-44 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841) (“If the 
search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the 
party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the 
wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence, if they 
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Rather, it arrived on the scene only in response to changes in the nature of 
law enforcement, the scope of police powers, and the increasing 
invasiveness of police practices.109  The exclusionary rule marks the courts’ 
response to these changes and to the persistent inability of the political 
branches to regulate police conduct with any sustained effectiveness. As the 
Court reported in Elkins v. United States, “neither administrative, criminal 
nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and 
seizures.”110  By contrast, the exclusionary rule had almost immediate 
salutary effects when and where it was adopted, reducing Fourth 
Amendment violations, increasing training and therefore the 
professionalism of police officers, and expanding engagements between 
law enforcement and prosecutors.111   
The exclusionary rule was and remains controversial, of course.  It is 
also persistently targeted by several current justices on the Supreme 
Court.112  We can leave these debates aside for the moment, however, and 
simply take note of the historical fact that the exclusionary rule marks a 
doctrinal adaptation to changes in the nature of law enforcement 
institutions, their powers, and their practices.  Absent those changes, we 
likely would not have an exclusionary rule at all; and, absent the 
exclusionary rule, we likely would live in a world where illegal searches 
and other abuses of power were far more common.  To see some of what 
that world might look like, we need look no further than fields of police-
citizen engagements liberated from serious court scrutiny by those 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule that contribute to what I have described 
                                                                                                                 
were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were.”)).  As Akhil Amar has pointed out, 
the exclusive remedies for illegal searches and seizures prior to 1886 were to be found in 
common law trespass.  Id. at 774; see also id. at 787 (“As late as 1883, the leading evidence 
treatise clearly proclaimed illegally procured evidence admissible . . . .”); William C. 
Heffernan, Foreword, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 
Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 808 (2000) (noting the Court’s departure from the common law 
trespass as the exclusive remedy for illegal searches and seizures); Potter Stewart, The Road 
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372-77 (1983) (same).  Roger 
Roots recently has disputed this common wisdom in The Originalist Case for the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2010).  For a brief critique of his views, 
see Gray, supra note 107, at 14 n.82. 
 109. See id. at 13-26. 
 110. 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960) (quoting People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955)).   
 111. Id. at 219-21.   
 112. See Gray, supra note 107, at 16-21. 
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elsewhere as the Court’s contemporary silver platter doctrine.113  These 
include grand jury investigations,114 immigration enforcement,115 civil tax 
proceedings,116 and parole enforcement.117  In each of these arenas, we can 
see both examples of unchecked Fourth Amendment violations and the 
threat and potential for more widespread abuses. 
The rule announced in Katz v. United States reinforces this narrative of 
doctrinal adaptation to historical changes in police power and practice.118  
Although not specified in the text of the Fourth Amendment, for at least a 
century after ratification, “search” was understood in reference to concepts 
of common law trespass.119  As a consequence, Fourth Amendment rights 
were tied to property rights.120  On this point, Olmstead v. United States is 
most often cited.121  There, the Court held that intercepting telephone 
conversations using wiretapping technology did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment “search” because deploying and using that technology did not 
require a physical invasion of the home.122   
The Court’s views on wiretapping began to shift over the next several 
decades, both as telephones became a more common feature of daily life 
and as wiretapping took a more prominent place in the law enforcement 
toolbox.123  That shift culminated with Katz in 1967.124  There, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 113. David Gray, Meagan Cooper, & David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s 
Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2012).   
 114. Id. at 21-25. 
 115. Id. at 25-36. 
 116. Id. at 46. 
 117. Id. at 36-46. 
 118. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 119. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth 
Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred 
simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; 
the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”); see 
also Slobogin, supra note 92, at 3-4.  But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth 
Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 68-69 (arguing that the trespass test of Fourth 
Amendment searches is a myth created by the Court in Katz). 
 120. Amar, supra note 108, at 786. 
 121. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347.  
 122. Id. at 466.  In a spirited dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that this property-based 
approach to the Fourth Amendment was anachronistic.  Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  That dissent drew on work that Justice Brandeis did in his groundbreaking 
article The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which he co-wrote with Samuel D. 
Warren. 
 123. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Oliver, supra note 99,  at 
460-61; see also DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF 
CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800-1887, at 4-9, 29-40 (1979). 
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concluded that “the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . [had] been so 
eroded . . . that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be 
regarded as controlling.”125  In its place, the Court adopted the view that the 
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,”126 and formulated a new 
definition of “search” organized around reasonable expectations of 
privacy.127  Under this standard, the Court held that surreptitiously listening 
to telephone conversations constitutes a “search” because citizens 
reasonably expect that those conversations are private.128   
Like the exclusionary rule, the Katz doctrine marks an adaptation of 
constitutional doctrine to changes in law enforcement and society that has 
no doubt had significant salutary effects on the relationships between 
citizens and law enforcement.  Just to cite one example, Katz impelled 
adoption of the Wiretap Act.129  Absent Katz, the concept of the Fourth 
Amendment search likely would remain limited by the law of trespass,130 
and the use of wiretapping would be left to the unfettered discretion of law 
enforcement.  As recent experiences show, efforts by law enforcement to 
self-regulate or efforts by legislatures to limit government access to 
surveillance technologies solely through extra-constitutional means would 
be very unlikely to have imposed any real restraint on the use of 
wiretapping technology.  It took a shift in constitutional doctrine to impel 
legislative action 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.  Berger v. New York, decided in the term prior to Katz, set the 
stage while also providing specific guidance to Congress as it considered its legislative 
options. 388 U.S. 41, 54-60 (1967).  In Berger, the Court found that New York’s regulatory 
regime governing wiretapping was constitutionally insufficient.  Id. at 63-64. 
 125. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.   
 126. Id. at 351. 
 127. Id. at 351-52. 
 128. Id. at 352 (noting that telephone booths function as spaces of aural repose in which 
citizens may reasonably expect that their communications will not be monitored by 
“uninvited ear[s]”). 
 129. See HOWARD J. KAPLAN ET AL., THE HISTORY AND LAW OF WIRETAPPING 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/ 
sac_2012/29-1_history_and_law_of_wiretapping.authcheckdam.pdf (“Congress therefore 
regarded Katz and Berger as instructive on how to draft a constitutionally sound wiretapping 
law and thereafter passed the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. Title III of that Act 
addresses interception of communications and remains to this day the law that governs the 
federal use of wiretaps.”). 
 130. As the Court recently has made clear, the trespass-based approach to defining 
Fourth Amendment “search” remains in force. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
949-51 (2012); id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The Katz doctrine marks a 
doctrinal addition that can enhance, but not degrade, rights and protections.   
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The LEATPR Standards break from this pattern.  There can be no doubt 
that the rules and regulations promoted by the Standards are designed to 
contend with dramatic changes in society, surveillance technology, and law 
enforcement practice.  In its current form, Fourth Amendment doctrine is 
unable to meet these challenges.  If past is prologue, then we might expect a 
doctrinal reaction.  The Court came close in United States v. Jones, with 
five justices expressing support for a “quantitative” approach to assessing 
Fourth Amendment rights and protections that would respond to enhanced 
surveillance and data aggregation technologies.131  Justice Sotomayor went 
a step further, suggesting that law enforcement’s increasing reliance on 
these technologies may make it “necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”132  Nevertheless, the LEATPR 
Standards explicitly decline to propose or promote a constitutional 
foundation for the overall project of reform or for the rules and regulations 
that comprise the core of its proposals.  This raises serious concerns. 
Foremost among these are questions of constitutional sufficiency and 
necessity.  Although the Standards are not grounded by any proposed 
change in Fourth Amendment law or doctrine, there can be little doubt that 
such a change is coming.  When it does, the Standards will face questions 
of constitutional sufficiency and necessity.  At that point, the Standards 
might well turn out to be constitutionally infirm.  They might also turn out 
to be largely gratuitous.  Absent some kind of constitutional commitment 
on the part of the Standards that is linked to its regulatory proposals, there 
is simply no way to know.   
This mystery marks a significant barrier against adoption.  After all, the 
Standards propose significant changes in current practice and even require 
the development of new internal control structures within police agencies.  
It is hard to see why the political branches would make these changes 
without some idea that they are both necessary and sufficient to meet 
constitutional demands.  Here, the Wiretap Act provides a helpful example.  
Although Katz did not squarely overrule Olmstead, combined with Berger 
v. New York, it described the Fourth Amendment theory and doctrine that 
would govern wiretapping going forward.  Acting on this advice, Congress 
passed the Wiretap Act,133 which limits law enforcement access to 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-51; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962-65 
(Alito, J., concurring with Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ.). 
 132. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 133. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
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wiretapping technology by requiring warrants and court monitoring of all 
active wiretaps.134  Those new rules and regulations clearly were tied to the 
doctrinal changes effected by Katz, and as a consequence have been largely 
immune to constitutional challenge.  Although the Standards do not yet 
have the benefit of a Katz for the twenty-first century, they could go quite 
far in meeting concerns about their constitutional status if they were tied to 
a Fourth Amendment theory—novel though it might be. 
The absence of an underlying Fourth Amendment theory that would 
buttress the Standards also raises serious questions about the Standards’ 
effectiveness in practice.  As the courts’ experiences with alternatives to the 
exclusionary rule show, law enforcement agencies caught up in the 
“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”135 largely are incapable of 
self-regulation and immune to meaningful legislative regulation.  Although 
the Standards describe a role for the courts in reviewing some efforts to 
gain access to some information held by some third parties,136 the overall 
scheme remains a free-flying balloon from a constitutional point of view.  
As a consequence, courts remain powerless to compel adoption of the 
Standards or to review law enforcement conduct governed by the 
Standards.137  Here again, the Wiretap Act provides a useful model.  Linked 
as it is to Katz, there can be no doubt that courts have the right and the duty 
both to limit government access to wiretapping technology and to enforce 
the overall regulatory scheme.  Because of their studiously agnostic stance 
with respect to constitutional issues, the Standards can make no such claim. 
Finally, in the absence of some kind of constitutional impetus, the 
Standards run full-force into the concerns described in the next section 
relating to the vagaries of the political process.  Acting in the wake of 
Berger and Katz, Congress had little choice but to regulate wiretapping.  
Furthermore, had Congress failed to act, there can be no doubt that the 
courts would have.  Absent that Fourth Amendment sword of Damocles, 
there is no reason to think that the Wiretap Act would have been adopted, 
stable, or effective in any sustained way.  The challenges posed by 
contemporary surveillance and dataveillance technologies are greater by far 
than those posed by wiretapping in 1968.  Thus, absent some kind of 
                                                                                                                 
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012). 
 135. United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 136. See STANDARD 25-5.3.  
 137. The Standards suggest that its regulations could be imposed on law enforcement by 
courts exercising their “supervisory authority.”  STANDARD 25-3.4.  As is discussed below, 
the project described by the Standards exceeds the scope of that authority absent some claim 
of constitutional necessity. 
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constitutional driver that can both compel action by the political branches 
and constrain the outcome of that action, there is serious doubt that the 
Standards will be either adopted or effective.   
This may seem to put the LEATPR Standards and their drafters in a 
Catch-22: If the Standards adopt a constitutional theory under which the 
provisions described are constitutionally necessary, then there is really no 
reason for the Standards in the first place.  Alternatively, if the Standards 
are not constitutionally necessary, then they will not be adopted and may 
not even meet constitutional demands.  That is not where the foregoing 
critique leaves the Standards, however.  Questions relating to what the 
Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement to do in their engagements 
with citizens’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects” have been a constant 
since the rise of professionalized police forces in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  The point pressed here is that they are constitutional questions.  If 
the Standards were grounded in a prescribed doctrinal adaptation, as were 
the exclusionary rule and the Wiretap Act, then they could be quite useful 
in providing guidance to courts, legislatures, and law enforcement agencies.  
Absent a clear account of what that constitutional adaptation to 
contemporary surveillance technologies, techniques, and practices looks 
like, there is serious doubt that they will be very influential or useful.   
There is a risk, of course, that, were the Standards to abandon their 
agnosticism, then the constitutional theory they adopt may turn out to be 
wrong.  That possibility should not deter supporters from taking the 
constitutional plunge, however.  Consider the possibilities: The Standards 
might get the constitutional question right, demonstrating both necessity 
and parsimony in the provisions proposed.  That, of course, would be an 
ideal outcome.  Alternatively, the Standards might undershoot on the 
constitutional front, with the consequence that the provisions would later 
turn out to be constitutionally insufficient.  Of course, if that’s the case, 
then the Standards are already a failed enterprise.  That failure would not be 
lessened by the decision to offer a constitutional foundation from the outset.  
Finally, if the Standards turn out to be constitutionally sufficient, but in 
some ways also gratuitous, then they would be in no worse position than 
they are now.  In other words, there really is nothing to lose by grounding 
the Standards in a constitutional theory. Quite to the contrary, there is 
everything to be gained.   
IV. Consequences of Relying on the Political Process 
Because the Standards are not grounded in any claim of constitutional 
necessity or sufficiency, responsibility for adopting and enforcing their 
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provisions is left to “legislatures, courts acting in their supervisory 
capacities, and administrative agencies.”138  This ultimately means that the 
fate of the Standards and their proscriptions is left entirely in the hands of 
the political process.  Given past experience and recent revelations, this 
strategy is likely to fail.  It may even be dangerous to the overall project of 
imposing reasonable constraints on law enforcement access to records held 
by third parties.  The fact that the Standards do not reach post-arrest 
investigations or national security investigations only makes matters 
worse.139  This section explores some of these concerns. 
To start, we can set aside any real hope that the courts will impose the 
Standards or any of their constituent provisions absent a claim of 
constitutional necessity.  Courts’ supervisory authorities simply do not 
stretch that far.140  Appellate courts have some supervisory authority over 
the procedures adopted by their inferior courts.  Trial courts have limited 
authority to set the rules governing the conduct of parties that appear before 
them in particular cases.141  But courts and litigants are not the main 
regulatory targets for the Standards, which concern themselves primarily 
with police procedure.  The discretionary authority granted to courts simply 
does not extend to the conduct of police during the course of 
investigations—at least not without a specific legislative grant or a claim of 
constitutional necessity.142  Thus, any attempt by a court to impose the 
                                                                                                                 
 138. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 9. 
 139. See STANDARD 25-2.1(a)-(b).  
 140. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1433, 1455, 1464-94 (1984) (pointing out that the Court’s exercise of its supervisory 
powers has been limited to efforts to “promote the search for the truth, to protect the 
integrity of the courts, to remedy violations of individual rights, and to impose sanctions 
against government misconduct” and arguing that much of even these limited efforts 
constitute overreach).   
 141. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a).  
 142. The Supreme Court’s limited claim of supervisory authority over law enforcement 
arises from its decision in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), superseded in part 
by 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012).  Even in that case, however, the Court limited the compass of 
its own power to review law enforcement practices to those circumstances where “courts 
themselves become instruments of law enforcement” by explicitly or implicitly endorsing 
illegal conduct.  Id. at 347.  Given the fact that any law enforcement efforts that would be 
regulated by the Standards are by definition legal under the Court’s own third party doctrine, 
it is hard to see where the Court, or any court, could find authority to exercise supervisory 
powers over law enforcement without first holding that current practices are unconstitutional 
or otherwise illegal. 
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Standards or its provisions based solely on its supervisory authority would 
almost certainly run afoul of basic separation of powers principles.143   
Take Miranda warnings as a point of comparison.  The Miranda 
warnings comprise perhaps the most minimal imposition on police 
procedure one could imagine.  Nevertheless, the Court has been quite clear 
that its ability to require Miranda warnings derives from its constitutional 
authority, not from some discretionary, supervisory power over law 
enforcement.144  It is hard to see how the Court, or any court, could mandate 
prophylactic measures as complex as the Standards based solely on a claim 
of supervisory authority when something as simple as Miranda warnings 
must be grounded in a claim of constitutional necessity.   
Nothing would seem to change if the Standards were recast as rules of 
evidence.  The Standards do not attach themselves to traditional common 
law rules of evidence such as relevance, reliability, prejudice, or hearsay, 
and it is hard to see how they could.  Furthermore, few courts have sole 
authority over the rules of evidence they apply, instead sharing that power 
with legislatures.145  Thus, if a court were to create a new category of 
evidentiary rules based solely on supervisory powers, without any footing 
in either the common law or the Constitution, that effort would be patent 
overreach.146  At any rate, the courts’ sole remedy for violations of the 
Standards if they are treated as rules of evidence is exclusion of evidence 
acquired from third party records.  Even at its most expansive, the Court 
has never deployed exclusion as a remedy in the absence of some claim of 
illegality.147  It is hard to see how a violation of the Standards could 
constitute illegal conduct unless they are adopted as law by the political 
branches or backed by a finding of constitutional necessity from the courts.  
                                                                                                                 
 143. Beale, supra note 140, at 1473-74 (“Although the term ‘procedure’ may properly be 
defined more broadly for other purposes, separation of power principles provide strong 
support for the application of the narrow definition when the issue is the scope of the federal 
courts’ implied constitutional authority.”); id. at 1506 (“Although judicial integrity and 
separation-of-power principles are important considerations in formulating an appropriate 
remedy for a violation of federal law, they provide no independent source of authority for 
the exercise of supervisory power when there has been no violation of any constitutional 
provision or federal statute.  The federal courts’ authority to create federal common law may 
provide an additional basis for some supervisory power decisions, but it cannot be expanded 
to control matters left by the Constitution either to the states or to a coordinate federal 
branch.”). 
 144. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). 
 145. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1959).  
 146. See Beale, supra note 140, at 1509, 1515-16, 1521. 
 147. See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345-46; Beale, supra note 140, at 1507. 
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The consequence is that responsibility for adopting the Standards or any of 
its measures will fall inevitably and ultimately to the political branches. 
Because the Standards rely on the political branches for their adoption, 
they are dependent upon the political will of legislators and executives to 
act on their own initiatives without any threat of court intervention that 
would accompany a claim of constitutional necessity.  In the present 
environment, at least, it is hard to see whence that initiative would come. 
Supporters might draw some hope from prior legislative efforts to regulate 
law enforcement access to information held by third parties.  For example, 
they might point to the Penn Register Act,148 which was passed in the wake 
of Smith vs. Maryland,149 or the Video Privacy Protection Act,150 passed in 
response to disclosures of Robert Bork’s video rental history after he was 
nominated by Ronald Reagan to a position on the Supreme Court.151  It is 
surely true that these laws provide constitutionally gratuitous protections, 
and therefore demonstrate the potential for recruiting political will 
sufficient to limit the third party doctrine in specific cases.  To extrapolate 
from these specific examples more general support for the broader 
regulations proposed by the Standards would, however, be akin to the 
fallacy of generalizing from the particular.  Far more likely are piecemeal 
initiatives such as recent efforts led by Senator Patrick Leahy to amend the 
Stored Communications Act to reflect changes in expansion of online 
storage of electronic mail.152  But, given the glacial progress of this narrow, 
and relatively uncontroversial measure, this looks more like an exception 
that proves the rule of legislative inaction rather than an example of 
political will building around a broader, more expansive set of regulations 
on the scale of the Standards. 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Pen/Trap Statute (Pen Register Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, Title III, § 301(a), 100 
Stat. 1848, 1868. 
 149. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 150. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)).  
 151. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988).  One might add to this list other components of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, including the Wiretap Act and the Stored 
Communications Act, but that would be a mistake.  Both of these provisions trace directly to 
the threat of constitutional regulation posed by Katz and its progeny.  That the SCA limited 
its extension of warrant protection to electronic communications stored for fewer than 180 
days proves the point.  In 1986, when the law was passed, that line described what 
legislators imagined to be the outlying boundary for how long service providers could 
physically and economically store communications committed to their custody for purposes 
of transport.   
 152. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, S. 607, 113th 
Cong. (2013).  
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To see clear evidence of the lack of political will that is available to 
advance broad and general regulations along the lines described by the 
Standards, we need look no further than the remarkable absence of coherent 
public outcry in the wake of recent revelations about broad, pervasive, and 
indiscriminate surveillance efforts.  Take, for example, New York’s 
Domain Awareness System.  When confronted with comparisons of the 
technology to the dystopian surveillance state described by George Orwell 
in 1984, Mayor Bloomberg boasted that the NYPD was no longer a “mom 
and pop police department.”153  In the intervening months there have been 
no serious public or legislative efforts to challenge either the technology or 
its implementation.  Public docility in the face of revelations that the NSA, 
FBI, and CIA are engaged in policies of broad and indiscriminate searches, 
such as the telephony metadata program,154 and surreptitious infiltration of 
networks owned and operated by major internet companies, provides yet 
more evidence that there is insufficient political will to compel serious 
regulation.155   
This is not to suggest that there has been no pushback.  There are a few 
legislators who have taken to the floor of their respective chambers to 
condemn the executive agencies involved and the lack of substantive court 
oversight.156  Several internet companies have also offered strident public 
critiques.157  Others have made it corporate policy to fight back.  For 
example, Twitter has committed itself to protecting user information to any 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super 
Computer System That Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate Readers, and 
Crime Reports, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computer-system-data-network-cameras-license-plate-
readers-crime-reports-article-1.1132135. 
 154. See, e.g., Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 6.  
 155. On this front, at least, there may be some movement.  As this essay goes to press, 
the House of Representatives passed the USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th  Cong. 
(2014) (as passed by House, May 22, 2014), which would amend the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act to change the process by which the FBI and NSA would gain access to 
business records, including telephonic metadata.  The text of the bill can be found at H.R. 
3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/ 
house-bill/3361 (last visited May 27, 2014). 
 156. Ashley Parker, Republicans, Led by Rand Paul, Finally End Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/rand-paul-does-not-go-quietly-
into-the-night/?ref=politics. 
 157. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 12 (quoting David Drummond, Chief Legal Officer 
at Google, as stating, “We are outraged at the lengths to which the government seems to 
have gone to intercept data from our private fiber networks, and it underscores the need for 
urgent reform”). 
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extent it can, including efforts to quash subpoenas and other requests for 
user information.158  Some companies have also made it a practice to 
publish the number of subpoenas they have received and to which they have 
responded.159  Most recently, Google and its employees have reacted with 
outrage and profanity to news that their secure networks were penetrated by 
the NSA, allowing the government broad access to the contents of customer 
communications and the cloud storage facilities where user content is 
stored.160  None of this reaction has matured into action, however—and it is 
hard to imagine that it ever will.  That is because there is a 500-pound 
gorilla in the room, which has time and again proved capable of crushing 
any serious efforts to secure privacy against government dataveillance: 
national security.   
The LEATPR Standards specifically decline to address governments’ 
accessing third party records for the purposes of national security.161  This 
omission dooms the Standards’ prospects for two reasons.  First, the 
Standards simply cannot hope to generate any political will for their own 
adoption in the face of countervailing complaints that such procedures as 
the Standards describe would compromise national security.  Attempting to 
carve off national security investigations just makes matters worse by 
adding validity to irrationally overblown claims of existential threats that 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S. 2d 590 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 159. See, e.g., Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
userdatarequests/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 160. Google Employees on NSA: ‘F*ck These Guys’, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 6, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/06/google-nsa_n_4227596.html; Google Statement on 
NSA Infiltration of Links Between Data Centers, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/google-statement-on-nsa-infiltration-of-links-between-
data-centers/2013/10/30/75f3314a-41b3-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html. 
 161. STANDARD 25-2.1(a).  There is a chance that some of the concerns that follow are 
mooted by the Standards’ definition of “national security acquisitions” as “those intended to 
acquire information concerning a foreign power or an agent thereof.”  STANDARD 25-2.1(a) 
commentary.  For example, taken literally, this definition of “national security” would 
exclude investigations of terrorism, border security, and the NSA’s telephonic dataveillance 
program because none of these necessarily involves a “foreign power” or its agents.  The 
Standards themselves do not suggest this narrow, literal reading, however.  That is evident in 
the commentaries, which contemplate information gathering that might have prevented the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as outside the scope of the Standards.  Id.  Footnote 
14 in the introduction is even more explicit, appearing to embrace the broader definition of 
“national security” set forth in the USA PATRIOT Act, and explicitly encompassing 
“telephone records of a person who is not an agent of a foreign power, so long as those 
records are relevant to a national security investigation of such an agent.”  LEATPR 
STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 5 n.14. 
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have been used to grant largely unchecked license for law enforcement to 
engage in all sorts of invasive surveillance and dataveillance.  Second, even 
if the Standards were to provide sufficient reassurance to nervous 
legislators that national security would in no way be compromised by 
implementing significant access controls in the context of criminal 
investigations, the exception represented by the carve-out would swallow 
the rule. 
There can be no doubt that the primary use and abuse of the third party 
doctrine these days is in the national security arena.  From New York’s 
Domain Awareness System to the NSA’s gathering of all telephonic 
metadata generated by every call serviced by every telephone company in 
the United States, the primary justification officials cite is national security 
and the war on terror.  But these examples are little more than pebbles cast 
into still waters.  Rippling outward from this center are hundreds and 
thousands of federal agencies, state law enforcement, and local police 
departments that have been recruited into the ever-sprawling project of 
national security.  Every one of these agencies and agents is now deployed 
in the war on terror.   
For example, by rhetoric and bureaucratic design, immigration 
enforcement is now a centerpiece of national security policy.  Moreover, 
local law enforcement is now heavily involved through federal programs 
such as 529(g) and Secure Communities, which have successfully made 
immigration enforcement a primary law enforcement concern at every 
level—right down to local beat cops.162  Even the previously secular war on 
drugs has now got national security religion.  Some of this coming to the 
faith is understandable—the opiate trade traces straight back to terrorist 
centers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, after all163—but, with drug cartels and 
other organizations tied to cocaine and marijuana production in south and 
central America now designated “terrorist organizations” by the State 
Department,164 every local narcotics enforcement agency is engaged in 
national security activities.  If even the most quotidian of police actions—
traffic stops and drug investigations—can now be linked to national 
security, then the Standards look like the saddest damsel at the dance. 
None of this is a surprise.  During the founding era, when anti-federalists 
attacked the Constitution and the central government it contemplated as a 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Gray, Cooper, & McAloon, supra note 113, at 26-32. 
 163. See GRETCHEN PETERS, HOW OPIUM PROFITS THE TALIBAN 3-6 (2009), available at 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf.  
 164. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, STATE.GOV (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/ 
j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
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threat to individual liberty, critics knew the power of executive claims of 
emergency to justify invasive search and seizure.  Consider, for example, 
the prophetic words of the Maryland Farmer, who wrote in 1788 about the 
inability of common law prohibitions on general warrants to resist 
executive overreaching in “cases which may strongly interest the passions 
of government.”165  His concerns were well grounded not only in the 
American experience with writs of assistance, but also in British 
experiences with general warrants used to target political and religious 
subversives.  Reflecting on perhaps the most famous of these cases, Wilkes 
v. Wood,166 the Canadian Freeholder noted that executive officers are too 
“fond of doctrines of reason of state, and state necessity, and the 
impossibility of providing for great emergencies and extraordinary cases,” 
and that they therefore demanded “discretionary power in the Crown to 
proceed sometimes by uncommon methods not agreeable to the known 
forms of law.”167  What was true for our eighteenth century forebears is true 
for us today—and the same lesson applies: it is simply folly to hope that 
political will or self-restraint will be enough to keep government agents 
within the compass of powers proscribed for them by the liberty of their 
subjects.  Our forefathers understood that this goal can only be 
accomplished by enforcement of constitutional precommitments.168  There 
                                                                                                                 
 165. A MARYLAND FARMER, NO. 1 (1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 
462, 464 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987) (“[S]uppose for instance, that an 
officer of the United States should force the house, the asylum of a citizen, by virtue of a 
general warrant, I would ask, are general warrants illegal by the constitution of the United 
States?  Would a court, or even a jury, but juries are no longer to exist, punish a man who 
acted by express authority, upon the bare recollection of what once was law and right?  I fear 
not, especially in those cases which may strongly interest the passions of government, and in 
such only have general warrants been used.”). 
 166. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.).  
 167. 2 THE CANADIAN FREEHOLDER: IN THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN AN ENGLISHMAN 
AND A FRENCHMAN SETTLED IN CANADA 243-44 (London, B. White 1779). 
 168. As Thomas Davies has shown, the Fourth Amendment was adopted as a 
constitutional Precommitment against not only executive overreach but legislative license as 
well.  See Davies, supra note 99, at 578-81, 657-60, 663-64, 668.  Specifically, although 
general warrants were prohibited under the common law well before 1791, anti-federalists 
were concerned that the federal government might be tempted to pass legislation licensing 
general warrants, particularly if faced with a claim of emergency or necessity.  Id. at 668 
(“[The framers] thought the important issue, and the only potential threat to the right to be 
secure, was whether general warrants could be authorized by legislation.”).  Recent 
amendments to the USA PATRIOT Act that have been exploited, with legislative 
acquiescence and approval, to allow the NSA to pursue broadening dataveillance programs 
under the auspices of general warrants issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
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is no reason to think that the project of reform and regulation described by 
the Standards can escape this historically proven truth.169 
V. Some Concerns with the Core Approach 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones, 
and recent revelations about widespread and largely unchecked government 
surveillance and dataveillance, advocates, activists, technologists, and 
scholars have advanced a range of possible approaches to the challenge of 
preserving privacy in the twenty-first century.  Although diverse in the 
details, most of these proposals fall into one of four categories.   
The first is market-based and favors allowing the private sector to 
develop business models and technologies capable of protecting personal 
information.170  The problem with these proposals, of course, is that they 
perpetuate an arms race between government and corporate engineers.  
Moreover, even when the corporate guardians win, they are still vulnerable 
to overt demands for information, which few have so far been able to 
resist.171  As a consequence, pure market-based solutions seem to be 
doomed to failure without some kind of legislative or constitutional 
framework that can constrain government surveillance and limit legal 
access to third party records.   
The second strategy focuses on the duration of a search or the quantity of 
information that is discovered or aggregated.  In his concurring opinion in 
Jones, Justice Alito seemed to favor just this sort of approach.172  
Christopher Slobogin has picked up that mantle by elaborating model 
                                                                                                                 
provide a modern vision of our founders’ bête noir.  See Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 
119-23.  
 169. A similar case can be made based on the Standards’ decision not to regulate grand 
jury investigations. See STANDARD 25-2.1(c).  As I have argued elsewhere, the grand jury 
exception to the exclusionary rule has left largely unregulated a widening range of law 
enforcement-citizen engagements to the detriment of Fourth Amendment rights. See Gray, 
Cooper, & McAloon, supra note 113, at 21-25. 
 170. See, e.g., DISCONNECT, https://Disconnect.me (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 171. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  Yahoo reports rejecting only 8% of 
requests for user data from U.S. law enforcement agencies between July 1, 2013, and 
December 31, 2013. Transparency Report: Government Data Requests, YAHOO, 
https://transparency.yahoo.com/government-data-requests/US-JUL-DEC-2013.html (last 
visited May 13, 2014).  Google reports providing data in response to 83% of requests in the 
same time frame.  Transparency Report: Requests for User Information, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/https://www.google.
com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/ (last visited May 13, 2014).   
 172. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-63 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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legislation that would set boundaries on how long law enforcement officers 
can conduct surveillance and how much data they can aggregate.173  
Although far more promising than pure market-based approaches, proposals 
based on the duration of surveillance or raw quantity of data gathered 
inevitably will be under- and over-inclusive.174  Professor Slobogin has 
acknowledged these difficulties, and his proposed statute does its best to 
address them by striking reasonable bright lines,175 but even these efforts 
cannot avoid this inherent deficit of all purely quantitative approaches to 
regulating surveillance and data gathering. 
A third strategy would focus regulatory attention on the technologies that 
are used to facilitate surveillance and dataveillance.  Danielle Citron and I 
have argued for this strategy in a sustained way through a series of recent 
articles.176  As we point out in this work, the Fourth Amendment was 
conceived and designed as a bulwark against the temptations that 
legislatures and executives inevitably feel to derogate from the common 
law prohibition on general warrants.177  Our founders knew from their own 
experiences with writs of assistance that granting government agents broad 
powers to search anyone, anywhere, at any time, leaves all citizens insecure 
in their persons, homes, papers, and effects.178  The Fourth Amendment 
guarantees a right to security by limiting the government’s search powers 
within the compass of reasonableness.  In our view, technologies that are 
capable of facilitating policies of broad and indiscriminate search pose the 
same threat to general security that general warrants did in the eighteenth 
century.179  We therefore argue that law enforcement access to these 
technologies must be limited in order to effect a reasonable balance 
between government interests in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting 
crime and citizens’ interests in security from pervasive surveillance.180  As 
we point out, striking that balance will depend on the nature of the 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Slobogin, supra note 92, at 16-37. 
 174. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls 
and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
381, 427 (2013). 
 175. Slobogin, supra note 92, at 16-37. 
 176. See, e.g., Citron & Gray, supra note 98; Gray & Citron, supra note 174; Gray & 
Citron, supra note 18; Gray, Citron & Rinehart, supra note 39.  
 177. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 92-100. 
 178. Id. at 70, 93-96. 
 179. Id. at 101-05. 
 180. Id. at 101-03. 
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technology in question and the competing interests at stake.181  Sometimes 
warrants may be required.182  For other technologies, administrative review 
subject to court oversight may suffice.183  What the Fourth Amendment 
cannot abide, however, are efforts to revitalize general warrants such as 
those issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in support of 
the NSA’s telephony metadata gathering program.184   
The fourth major category of proposals focuses on the nature and 
significance of the information that is sought or secured.  Neil Richards has 
perhaps done the most to advance this strategy on the academic side 
through a series of articles driven by First Amendment rather than Fourth 
Amendment concerns.185  The LEATPR Standards also adopt this tack.  
Danielle Citron and I have argued elsewhere against this content-based 
approach on conceptual and practical grounds.186  Although the Standards 
provide a distinct and much more specific set of proposals than has been 
previously offered, they suffer the same conceptual and practical deficits 
and are therefore vulnerable to the same objections.  Before getting to those 
concerns, however, it is important to take notice of a failure that is unique 
to the Standards and is measured by its own metrics for progress.  
The Standards fail to advance the cause of privacy even according to 
their own internally defined metric.  “Privacy” for purposes of the 
Standards, is defined as the “ability to control what information about 
oneself is known to others and for what purposes that information is 
used.”187  The third party doctrine holds that, as a constitutional matter, 
there is only one way to control information and, in turn, only one way to 
control the purposes for which information is used: keep it secret.  In her 
concurring opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggests that this conflation 
of secrecy and privacy is no longer tenable in the age of Big Data and 
ubiquitous surveillance,188 and that we must therefore “reconsider” the third 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 105-24 (discussing the Fourth Amendment status of drones, data aggregation 
technology, and human surveillance under a technology-centered approach to quantitative 
privacy). 
 182. Id. at 105-12 (arguing for a warrant requirement covering discrete surveillance 
technologies like drones). 
 183. Id. at 112-24 (arguing for administrative review structures modeled on consent 
decrees to cover data aggregation technologies). 
 184. Id. at 119.   
 185. See, e.g., Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 97. 
 186. Citron & Gray, supra note 98. 
 187. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.  
 188. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I 
for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the 
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party doctrine.189  Without purporting to disrupt constitutional doctrine,190 
the Standards take a similar view of the relationship between secrecy and 
privacy.  “[P]rivacy is not secrecy,” we are told.191  Rather, “secrecy is 
merely one form of privacy.”192   Thus, although it is true to the point of 
tautology that keeping information about oneself secret will serve to keep 
that information private as well, the Standards seek more bespoke measures 
that will allow us to share personal information while still preserving some 
level of control over the use and dissemination of that information.  
Unfortunately, the Standards fail in that effort.  To see why, it is necessary 
to examine the regulatory strategy that the Standards adopt. 
The Standards’ strategy for offering greater privacy controls without 
requiring secrecy is organized around two overlapping spectrums.  The first 
spectrum measures the privacy interests that individuals might hold in 
information they share with third parties.  Some information is “highly 
private,” some is “moderately private,” some is “minimally private,” and 
some is “not private” at all.193  The second spectrum describes four ways 
that law enforcement might gain access to information held by third parties 
without the consent194 of the person whose privacy interests are at stake: by 
                                                                                                                 
Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. 
But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only 
if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for 
privacy.”). 
 189. Id. 
 190. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 6-9. 
 191. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary. 
 192. Id. 
 193. STANDARD 25-4.2. 
 194. Consent gets separate treatment under the Standards: 
 Law enforcement should be permitted to access by particularized request 
any record maintained by an institutional third party if: 
 (a) the focus of the record has knowingly and voluntarily consented to that 
specific law enforcement access; 
 (b) the focus of the record has knowingly and voluntarily given generalized 
consent to law enforcement access, and 
 (i) the information in the record is unprotected or minimally protected;  
 (ii) it was possible to decline the generalized consent and still obtain the 
desired service from the provider requesting consent, and the focus of the 
record had specifically acknowledged that it was possible; or 
 (iii) a legislature has decided that in a particular context, such as certain 
government contracting, generalized consent should suffice for the information 
contained in the record; or  
 (c) the record pertains to a joint account and any one joint account holder 
has given consent as provided in subdivision (a) or (b). 
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court order195 based on a judicial determination of probable cause,196 by 
court order based on a judicial determination of reasonable suspicion or a 
finding of investigative need,197 by prosecutorial subpoena,198 or by an 
official certification of a politically accountable official within a law 
enforcement agency.199  Symmetry dictates what follows: in order for law 
enforcement to demand access to records held by third parties that contain 
highly private information, a court order based on a judicial finding of 
probable cause is required;200 records containing moderately private 
information require a court order based on reasonable suspicion or a finding 
of investigative need;201 access to records containing minimally protected 
information requires a subpoena;202 and information that is not private at all 
requires only an official certification.203   
There is no doubt that the framework proposed by the Standards marks 
an improvement over current practices operating under the third party 
doctrine.  Foremost, the Standards recognize that sharing information does 
not, or at least should not, entail a complete abdication of all expectations 
of privacy.204  Unfortunately, that is all that is offered.  The Standards do 
not challenge in any fundamental way the structured assumptions about the 
                                                                                                                 
STANDARD 25-5.1. 
 195. The Standards describe a “court order” as: 
 (i) a judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe the 
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime; 
 (ii) a judicial determination that there is reasonable suspicion to believe the 
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime;  
 (iii) a judicial determination that the record is relevant to an investigation; 
or 
 (iv) a prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an 
investigation. 
STANDARD 25-5.2(a). 
 196. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i).  
 197. See STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii)-(iv). 
 198. STANDARD 25-5.2(b) (requiring that subpoenas be “based upon a prosecutorial or 
agency determination that the record is relevant to an investigation”). 
 199. STANDARD 25.52(c) (requiring that official certifications be “based upon a written 
determination by a politically accountable official that there is a reasonable possibility that 
the record is relevant to initiating or pursuing an investigation”). 
 200. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(i). 
 201. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii). 
 202. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii). 
 203. STANDARD 25-5.3(d) (“Law enforcement should be permitted to access unprotected 
information for any legitimate law enforcement purpose.”).   
 204. See STANDARD 25-3.3 commentary.  
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nature of privacy and its relationship to secrecy that underlie the third party 
doctrine.  This general approach is both problematic and worrisome. 
Although often condensed as “the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties,”205 the third party doctrine is not so broad.  Were it so, then 
there would be no constitutional barrier against wiretapping or any other 
interception of communications because all information imparted during a 
conversation is by definition “disclosed to third parties.”  Rather, the third 
party doctrine holds that the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the 
government obtains through lawful means information from a third party 
that an investigative target voluntarily shared with that third party.206  Put 
differently, sharing information with a third party entails an assumption of 
risk that the third party might share that information with others, either 
voluntarily or if compelled to do so by “legal process.” 207   
As the LEATPR Standards rightly recognize, this “assumption of risk” 
model of privacy conflates privacy and secrecy.  The Standards are deeply 
critical of the third party doctrine on this score.  “Privacy,” according to the 
Standards, is more expansive than secrecy. It “is the more encompassing 
ability to control what information about oneself is known to others, and for 
what purposes that information is used.”208  Secrecy is certainly one method 
of preserving privacy, but it is not, and should not be, the only way.  After 
all, it makes very little sense to talk about “control” if the only options are 
to quit, abdicate, withdraw, or simply not participate in the first place.209  
To draw the inevitable sports analogy, we certainly would not say that a 
basketball player has excellent ball control when all he does is hold the ball, 
never dribbling, passing, or shooting.  Rather, “control” implies 
engagement, and describes the ability to restrain, direct, and influence the 
course and outcome of events once one has engaged.  To the extent that 
                                                                                                                 
 205. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
443 (1976)). 
 206. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). 
 207. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (finding that a person who uses the phone “assume[s] the risk 
that the [telephone] company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed”).   
 208. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary. 
 209. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE 3.0: A CIVIL RIGHTS AGENDA TO COMBAT 
DISCRIMINATORY ONLINE HARASSMENT (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author) (arguing at 
length against the proposition that those who are subjected to online harassment should just 
stay off the internet); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 105 
(2009) (same). 
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privacy is a function of control, then, the Standards are perfectly right to 
hold that privacy is more than secrecy.   
Given the Standards’ critique of the third party doctrine’s conflation of 
secrecy and privacy, one would expect some effort by the Standards to 
provide means short of secrecy by which one could exercise control over 
personal information.  Unfortunately, they do not.  To the contrary, they 
reinforce the basic digital dynamic that underlies the third party doctrine: 
keep it secret, and preserve your privacy, or share, and run the risk that 
what you share will end up in the hands of law enforcement through lawful 
means.  It is certainly true that the Standards add dimension and specificity 
to the otherwise abstract notion of “lawful means,” but doing so provides 
no additional measures by which a person might exercise control over the 
use and dissemination of personal information.  Under the Standards, as 
under the status quo described by the third party doctrine, secrecy is the 
only game in town.   
To see the point, consider the two spectrums at the core of the Standards.  
The first spectrum describes a range of privacy interests one might have in 
a particular bit of information extending from “highly private” to “not 
private.”210  Given the Standards’ focus on control, one would expect to 
have a high degree of control over highly private information and very little 
control over information that is not private.  The Standards provide no such 
means of control, however.  Rather, the second spectrum describes a range 
of comparatively higher procedural hurdles for law enforcement to clear 
when seeking access to information.211  Nothing about the process of 
clearing those hurdles suggests any control by the subject.  It certainly does 
not provide for any additional tools that a person might use to limit the use 
and dissemination of private information.  Rather, it seems that we are still 
caught in a world where secrecy is the only means available for someone 
who wants to preserve her privacy. 
A defender of the Standards might respond to this point by shifting the 
conversation away from “control” in its colloquial sense to a more technical 
account that focuses on risk assessment.  On this view, the fundamental 
question is that which was initiated by the Court in Katz: reasonable 
expectations of privacy.  What the Standards really provide, then, is a more 
elaborate and specific risk profile that citizens can use when weighing 
whether to break the seal of secrecy by sharing personal information.  Thus, 
we might reasonably expect that “highly protected” information is less 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See STANDARD 25-4.1. 
 211. STANDARD 25-4.2. 
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likely to be shared with the government than “minimally protected” 
information.  In a somewhat paradoxical sense, then, one need be less 
cautious in sharing “highly protected” information, but might well need to 
keep completely secret anything that warrants only “minimal protection.” 
Unfortunately, this response does nothing more than admit defeat 
according to the Standards’ own, well, standards.  Remember that “privacy” 
according to the Standards is about control, not prediction.  As it stands, we 
all know that our telephone calls are being monitored for metadata and that 
the contents of our communications and data files transmitted through or 
held by Google are accessible by the NSA.  It would tax the language, 
however, to claim that this knowledge is what we mean by “privacy,” much 
less “control.”  To the contrary, if “privacy” is a function of control, then 
knowledge that one has no control means that one has no privacy.   
Nothing changes if one can predict that information will only be 
accessible by provision of a judicial warrant.  All that does is specify the 
process that law enforcement must go through to gain access to personal 
information.  It does not inform the citizen of how likely that eventuality is.  
Neither do the LEATPR Standards suggest other means by which a citizen 
could negotiate, impose, or enforce any sort of constraints on the sharing of 
information, even if governed by a warrant process.  Thus, shifting the 
ground from control to prediction simply highlights the fact that the 
Standards really do not offer any additional means to protect privacy by 
effecting “control [over] what information about oneself is known to others, 
and for what purposes that information is used.”212  The Standards instead 
put us back where we started: a practical, if not conceptual, collapsing of 
privacy into secrecy.  Under the Standards, as under the status quo, once 
information is shared, it is out of your control. 
The Standards’ failure to expand subjects’ control over the use and 
dissemination of private information beyond the nuclear option of secrecy 
is further reflected in the procedures law enforcement can use to access 
private information.  Just as under the status quo, law enforcement’s 
pathway to third party records under the regime described by the Standards 
is ex parte.  That means that the holders of privacy interests, who have both 
the purest need and the dearest desire to exercise control over access to 
third party records, will continue to be denied the opportunity to participate 
in the adversarial processes where their interests are assessed and either 
protected or compromised.  The Standards do impose certain notice 
                                                                                                                 
 212. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.  
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requirements,213 but these offer no real solace.  That is because the notice 
contemplated is post hoc.  So, once notice is received, the moment to 
exercise control has already passed.   
Perhaps the Standards’ most blinding failure to offer real control over 
information is found in the decision to give legislatures and courts sole 
authority to designate the level of privacy that will be afforded to 
information.  It is hard to imagine a more profound denial of control over 
information than allowing someone else to decide how “private” one’s 
private information is.  That the decision is a generic one does not change 
anything, and may well make matters worse.  That is because it emphasizes 
further the lack of real control that each of us has over our information.  Not 
only is the degree of privacy interest not your decision, but the Standards 
will not even consider your unique claims or circumstances.214  
Furthermore, the general approach to assessing privacy interests submits 
this most critical decision to a political process.  The inevitable result will 
be endless contests over which kinds of information deserve which level of 
protection.215  Marking the boundaries between information that is highly 
private and only moderately private presents practical problems, of course, 
but more worrisome is the inevitable politicization of the process and its 
outputs.  
By definition, decision makers designated by the Standards to categorize 
personal information will have to pick winners and losers among different 
persons and groups and among their competing conceptions of the good 
life.216  That process will almost inevitably lead to decisions that further 
marginalize and oppress minorities and those who hold minority views.217  
All the more so given the outsized influence that national security interests 
are bound to have.218  It is one thing to be told that government agents need 
access to the information you regard as most private in order to effectuate 
                                                                                                                 
 213. STANDARD 25-5.7. 
 214. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 12 (“It should be stressed that this 
determination will have been made by a legislature, administrative agency, or court” before 
law enforcement officers seek access.).  
 215. Cf. Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
311, 330-53 (2012) (leveling this argument against the “mosaic theory” of quantitative 
privacy).  For a critical discussion of Kerr’s concerns, see Gray & Citron, supra note 174, at 
422-28.  The Standards foresee these debates, see STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary, but fail to 
address the oppressive potential of the contests and the decisions. 
 216. Citron & Gray, supra note 98, at 267-68. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 19, at 1479-80 (exploring the Schmittian “state of 
emergency” exceptionalism embraced in the post-9/11 era). 
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the war on terror.  It is quite another, however, to be told that the 
information is not private at all because, were it otherwise, it would be too 
difficult for law enforcement to obtain regular access. 
The Standards appear to foresee this objection.  Specifically, the 
commentary to Standard 25-4.1 emphasizes that the assignment of privacy 
interest must come first and be considered separately from the level of 
privacy protection.219  In order to ensure that sequence, Standard 25-4.2(b) 
provides a safety valve of sorts for law enforcement, which would allow a 
legislature to lower the hurdles for accessing highly private information.  
There is no structural way to enforce this sequence, of course.220  
Furthermore, a quick look at the political costs of assigning relatively lower 
degrees of privacy interest to information versus granting law enforcement 
a broad exception suggests that passive aggression is the more likely 
course.  Even where the Standards’ preferred sequence is followed, the 
“out” offered by 25-4.2(b) seems like an exception that is very likely to 
swallow the rule given the outsized role played by national security 
interests in the current environment.  We need look no further than the 
general warrant issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for 
the NSA’s telephonic surveillance program to see both the pressures and 
the effects.221 
Supporters of the Standards might try another response, arguing that the 
four factors offered as relevant for assessing the privacy interests held in 
third party records will provide sufficient breadth and constraint to meet, or 
at least mostly moot, these concerns.222  Of course, that does nothing more 
than move the debate, and therefore the site of oppression, back one step.  
Moreover, the factors themselves seem to create more space for controversy 
and potential oppression than they provide guidance, predictability, or 
control.  Let us take a moment to consider each of them in turn. 
The first factor that legislatures, administrative agencies, or courts are 
tasked to consider when weighing the level of privacy interest held in 
information contained in third party records, is whether “the initial transfer 
of such information to an institutional third party is reasonably necessary to 
participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial, 
                                                                                                                 
 219. STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary. 
 220. STANDARD 25-4.2(b) (allowing legislatures to alter the scheme if it “would render 
law enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or 
preventable crime”).  
 221. See In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things 
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Apr. 25, 2013).  
 222. See STANDARD 25-4.1. 
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including to freedom of speech and association.”223  The main problems 
with this factor are, of course, that it is utterly ambiguous and requires the 
very selection among competing ethical views that Danielle Citron and I 
have warned against.  Let us consider first the ambiguity. 
Viewed one way, the first factor might cut in favor of assigning a higher 
privacy interest to information that comes under its wing.  After all, if the 
information is forced out by necessity rather than freely shared, then it 
would seem wrong to penalize the privacy holder for simply participating in 
the world.224  On the other hand, a functional requirement that information 
be shared in order to facilitate routine daily life may reflect a social 
discount such that it is no longer reasonable to preserve a strong privacy 
interest in that information.  In short, the need to share may tell us very 
little about the privacy interests.  We may be required to share very personal 
information, as when we tell our physicians about the uncomfortable rash 
we’ve developed “down there.”  Alternatively, we may be required to 
reveal information that is utterly banal, such as sharing preferences on 
brands of sneakers with an online vendor when searching their inventory.  
So, the fact that I am required to share information really says nothing 
about the implications of revelation for my privacy interests.225  
The more compelling problem with the first factor is, however, that it 
requires legislatures, administrative agencies, or courts to select among 
competing conceptions of the good life.  Neutrality as to ethical choice is a 
cornerstone of liberal democracies and is baked into the American 
consciousness.226  Citizens of equal standing who have different views on 
what, for them, constitutes the pursuit of happiness inevitably will have 
different views on what sort of information must be easily accessible in 
order to facilitate the social good and what must be protected as private in 
order to secure sufficient space for projects of ethical self-development.   
It is out of this respect for diversity of views on the nature and value of 
privacy that the Supreme Court has declined to make the kinds of 
assessments that the Standards demand.  In Kyllo v. United States, the Court 
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had the opportunity to link Fourth Amendment protections to the degree of 
intimacy entailed in the information gathered by law enforcement when 
using a heat detection device to peer into a home.227  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia declined this invitation because he thought the Court had 
neither the qualifications nor the authority to determine what is and is not 
“intimate.”228  Laying ground for the technology-centered approach that 
Danielle Citron and I have defended, Justice Scalia focused instead on the 
invasiveness of the technology itself and its potential to render a wide range 
of activities subject to government surveillance, whether “intimate” or 
not.229   
The Standards, of course, go in precisely the opposite direction.  Rather 
than preserving neutrality as to competing conceptions of intimacy, privacy, 
expression, and social benefit, they specifically charge legislatures, 
administrative agencies, and courts with the task of choosing among them.  
Elsewhere, Danielle Citron and I have warned about the dangers that inhere 
to these sorts of political contests, particularly for political and social 
outsiders, who more often than not make outsized contributions to society 
in the long term.230  The fact that the Standards give specific license to 
challenge and perhaps violate this basic democratic commitment to 
neutrality should give us pause.  
The second factor is neither more helpful nor less subject to contest.  
Here the Standards require that legislatures, agencies, and courts consider 
whether the information disclosed is “intimate and likely to cause 
embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside of the initial 
transfer to an institutional third party it is typically disclosed only within 
one’s close social network, if at all.”231  These are, of course, highly 
personal assessments.  Some of us—this author included—tend to be very 
private people.  We (I) would never share the sorts of information that 
others broadcast freely over blogs or social networking websites.  Where 
this is the case, a legislative, administrative, or court decision to go with 
what seems to be the public practice would by definition deny protection to 
those of us who are less visible precisely because we value our privacy. 
The third factor offered by the Standards to decision makers tasked to 
assess the privacy interests invested in particular kinds of information does 
little to add new opportunities for control or to temper threats posed by 
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submitting these questions to a political process.  Here, the Standards ask 
whether the information at issue “is accessible to and accessed by non-
government persons outside the institutional third party.”232  Here again, no 
additional opportunities to effect control appear to be offered.  Save the odd 
opportunity to decline a request from vendors to share our information with 
their commercial partners, we seldom have control over what institutional 
third parties do with the information we provide to them.  Their contracts 
for services, including their privacy policies, are almost always contracts of 
adhesion.  Moreover, even when we may be willing participants in 
information sharing among third parties, our reasons for being so are 
unlikely to translate directly into a lessened expectation of privacy with 
respect to sharing with law enforcement.  For example, I might be quite 
happy about the potential for information-sharing among health providers 
because it can advance the cause of providing me with more consistent and 
cost-effective care.  It does not follow, however, that this information is 
anything less than “highly private.” 
The fourth factor appears to hold a bit more promise, but also raises 
some confusion.  Here the Standards suggest that whether “existing law, 
including the law of privilege, restricts or allows access to and 
dissemination of such information or of comparable information” is 
relevant to assessing the level of privacy interest invested in that 
information.233  Although the promise of using collateral legislative efforts 
to effectuate constraints on law enforcement access is intriguing, the current 
landscape of such laws raises some eyebrows.  For example, access to video 
rental records is restricted by law,234 but access to location information is 
not.  The Standards’ reference to the laws of privilege is also a bit 
confusing.  Privilege addresses the party with whom information is shared, 
not what information is shared235—and it is the information that is of 
concern to the Standards.  Moreover, privilege covers a pretty wide range of 
information.  Some privileged relationships are centered on a fairly narrow 
range of types of information.  Patient-doctor relationships are a good 
example.  But others are not nearly so limited.  Take for example the range 
of information shared with lawyers, priests, and spouses.  It is so broad that 
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this fourth factor seems at risk of being overinclusive to the point of 
negation. 
For these and other reasons, Danielle Citron and I have argued elsewhere 
that efforts to protect privacy in the face of twenty-first century threats 
should focus on regulating law enforcement’s access to and use of 
surveillance and dataveillance technologies.236  In our view, what is 
troubling about the dataveillance technologies that take advantage of the 
third party doctrine is not what information they gather, but, rather, the 
broad, indiscriminate, and continuous nature of the surveillance they 
facilitate, and the effects of that surveillance on general security in our 
persons, houses, papers, and effects.237  If we want to preserve reasonable 
expectations of privacy against these technologies, then we should confront 
the threats that they pose directly.  The Standards choose a collateral 
approach.  For that reason, and for others set forth here, they are unlikely to 
succeed. 
VI. Conclusion 
There is, of course, much more to say and write about the LEATPR 
Standards.  They reflect both serious thinking and, perhaps more 
importantly, serious engagement among representatives of the many 
constituencies that are concerned with the current state of affairs with 
respect to law enforcement access to third party records.  Even though this 
essay is ultimately skeptical of the Standards on their own terms and on 
exogenous grounds, the merit of the enterprise and the value of the product 
cannot be denied and should not be dismissed.  The Standards truly 
represent a Herculean effort.  There is no doubt that they will serve as a 
valuable source of ideas and locus for important conversations going 
forward.  I, for one, am grateful for the opportunity to be part of this early 
engagement. 
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